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This article explores how council leaderships act as agents in promoting reputational 
policies. It introduces a public policy perspective to research on public sector reputation. 
It asks how the political leader and the administrative leader are agents in reputational 
policies and to what extent different interests and coalitions can influence thought pat-
terns and behaviour in the municipal organisation. What has been found is that the politi-
cal leader and the administrative leader may have different interests and strategies and 
that they are likely to be engaged in networks that might be narrow or broad in focus, 
scope and membership. These reputational agents and coalitions have an impact on repu-
tational policies. They have an impact on the understanding of ‘proper roles’ and routines 




Up to now, studies of reputation management in the public sector have tended to 
treat reputation management as “‘organisational’ and taken for granted prescrip-
tion with allegedly universal validity ready to be installed in any context” 
(Luoma-aho, 2007; Nielsen and Salomonsen, 2012; Ryan, 2007; Wæraas and 
Byrkjeflot, 2012; Wæraas and Maor, 2015) and where actors’ interests and mo-
tives endure a secondary status (see for example Røvik, 2007; Wæraas and 
Bjørnå, 2011) if touched upon at all. This article1 introduces a different perspec-
tive; one that sees public managers not only as receivers of ideas, aiming to 
adapt to and translate reputational  ‘recipes’ into the organisation, but as actors 
with their own motives for reputation management and politically conscious 
strategies. The point of departure is that reputation management represents a new 
policy for municipal council officials and politicians. It is well known that policy 
entrepreneurs have played a role in promoting policy changes (King and Rob-
erts, 1987; Kingdon, 1995; Mintrom and Vergari, 1996; Polsby, 1984; Weissert, 
1991) and that most policymaking occurs within networks and what are referred 
to as policy subsystems (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999). However, little is 
known about reputation policy entrepreneurs in the public sector who spearhead 
reputational change, i.e. those who do the footwork to get reputation policies 
onto the public agency agenda, how they go about this and to what degree they 
succeed in getting reputational policies adopted on a permanent basis. 
This article draws on insights from a public sector reputation perspective 
and introduces a public policy perspective to inquire how council leaderships act 
as agents to promote reputation policies. What are their objectives, and to what 
extent can different interests and coalitions influence changes in thought patterns 
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and behaviour in the municipal organisation? The aim is to explore the heuristic 
value of applying a public policy perspective in the study of reputation manage-
ment, i.e. to assess the benefits of looking at this phenomenon through a ‘new’ 
theoretical lens with a view to the potential it may have with regard to further 
investigations. 
The questions are investigated in relation to Norwegian local governments. 
As many as one third of Norway’s municipalities have had, or are currently 
involved in, ‘reputation building projects’.2 These projects are designed to over-
come challenges related to, for example, economic growth, ethics in the work-
place and in dealings with the public, the delivery of public services, and im-
proving people’s living and working conditions. The media have shown a re-
markable interest in reputation management (Wæraas, Byrkjeflot and Angell, 
2011). KS, the association of Norwegian municipalities, highlighted reputation 
building in its 2007 employer strategy (KS, 2007) and the former Norwegian 
Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development (through the Center 
of Competence on Rural Development) set up a ‘Reputational School’ for mu-
nicipalities in 2008. Besides this, we find several regional and other public agen-
cy initiatives (Wæraas, Bjørnå and Moldenæs, 2014). A number of municipali-
ties have also initiated reputation policy projects of their own. This is a case 
study of two medium sized municipalities that have set up and worked on their 
own reputation projects over a long period. One reputation project is mainly 
driven by the mayor, the other mainly by the chief executive.  
The article starts by defining the concept of organisational reputation as ap-
plied to the public sector, along with a discussion of what it is that allows us to 
look at Norwegian municipalities as a special form of public agency. We review 
the theoretical foundations in the article and discuss agenda setting, the policy 
entrepreneurship model, coalition networks and enduring policy changes. We 
then explain the study’s methodology before describing the contexts, aims, initi-
ators, partners, coalitions and achievements in the two case municipalities. This 
is followed by a discussion of the aims, interests, and coalitions involved in 
municipal reputation building. The article closes with some concluding remarks 
about different policy change strategies and their likely outcomes. 
 
Public organisations’ reputation  
How the word reputation is conceived and defined varies in both emphasis and 
scope. A commonly used definition in the American literature on the reputation 
of public organisations is Carpenter’s: “a set of symbolic beliefs about the 
unique or separable capacities, intentions, roles, obligations, history, and mission 
of an organisation that are embedded in a network of multiple audiences” (Car-
penter, 2010: 33,45). This definition highlights the evaluation of the organisa-
tion’s unique character and activities by multiple stakeholders, and on evalua-
tions based on past observations and experience. A reputation in this perspective 
is not reduced to a binary choice or outcome related to what a public agency has 
or does not have, or to something that an agency has ‘more’ or ‘less’ of as it 






focuses on the richness of administrative behaviour (Carpenter and Krause, 
2011). The organisation’s reputation derives from external audiences’ percep-
tions of the quality of its policy outcomes. However, organisations face multiple 
audiences and multiple, often conflicting, expectations, and must choose the 
dimension they want to address (see Maor, 2015). According to this ‘bureaucrat-
ic reputation’ literature, there are four critical dimensions of an organisation’s 
reputation that will have an impact on its audiences’ reactions (Carpenter, 2010: 
46-7; Carpenter and Krause, 2012);  
 
• Performative reputation (can the organisation do the job?) 
• Moral reputation (does it protect the interests of its clients?)  
• Procedural reputation (does it follow generally accepted 
norms and rules?) 
• Technical reputation (does it have the capacity and expertise 
to deliver as promised?)  
 
If public organisations successfully form, cultivate and manage reputations, they 
become “valuable political assets – they can be used to generate public support, 
to achieve delegated autonomy and discretion from politicians, to protect the 
agency from political attack, and to recruit and retain valued employees” (Car-
penter; 2002: 491; Maor, 2015). Strong reputations, in other words, are assets for 
public organisations. 
Reputation building and brands can operate as catalysts within organisations 
by facilitating the integration of strategy, organisational change, organisational 
culture and marketing (Kornberger, 2010). The organisational culture dimension 
of reputation management in local government is critical in developing stake-
holder trust. This is developed through customer service, vision and leadership, 
emotional appeal, the service offered and corporate governance (Ryan, 2007). 
From studies of local governments in Australia, we find that such elements can 
affect the quality of service delivery, workplace and customer satisfaction 
(Jones, 1999; Ryan, 2007; Tucker, 1997).  
Local governments differ from most public agencies in being both political 
units and administrative agencies and this is likely to affect reputational policies 
(Bjørnå, 2014, 2015; Salomonsen, 2011; Wæraas and Bjørnå, 2011). The admin-
istrative and political leaderships have many of the same tasks and challenges. 
They are responsible for implementing policies; they identify strategic problems 
and solutions, and they motivate each other and junior officials. However, the 
success of the political leadership also depends on its management and change of 
municipal and community identities, attitudes and values and on how it handles 
internal conflicts (Sørensen and Torfing, 2013). Identifying new and innovative 
solutions to problems is another part of the political process and a crucial factor 
in the rivalry between the political elites of different hues (Polsby, 1984). From 






policies can be a problem as practical considerations can hinder political agree-
ment on how to act and that higher political ambitions can be lost on the way 
(Brorström, 2015). Research from Denmark finds that both local government 
politicians and administrators are involved and that reputation management is 
neither a depoliticised activity nor a topic of much disagreement (Salomonsen 
and Nielsen, 2015). 
Norwegian municipalities take the lion’s share of public welfare and they 
occupy a prominent position within the government structure.3 Politically, most 
of the Norwegian municipalities have an aldermanic system, an organisational 
form in which positions are allocated among the main political parties according 
to their strength in the local council (Baldersheim, 2005). Political decisions are 
usually based on consensus and coalitions (Bjørnå, 2014; Larsen, 2005). Norwe-
gian councils also have an administration headed by an appointed – and power-
ful – official known as the chief executive (Mouritzen and Svara, 2002). The 
chief executive is responsible for the workings of the administrative apparatus, 
the purpose of which is to deliver services and execute political decisions.  
This distinctive feature of municipal organisations – their two-tiered leader-
ship – prompts questions about how they promote reputational policies as agents 
of reputational change. We assume that attitudes to reputational management and 
change will vary with positioning in the municipal bureaucracy or political hier-
archy. Like Salomonsen and Nielsen (2015), we start out with the assumption 
that political and administrative leaders will have different interests and strate-
gies, which may lead to different policy outcomes. The political and administra-
tive agents of reputational change may emphasise the different dimensions of 
organisational reputation based on the differentiability of their subunits’ task 
activities (see Carpenter and Krause, 2012).  
 
Policy entrepreneurship, agenda setting, networks, and 
change 
We define reputation management as political action to capture and display the 
uniqueness of a municipality or its subsections on different organisational di-
mensions. This differs from reputation management seen as an idea or a move-
ment that involves imitation processes and how agencies accommodate and 
practice various reputation management ‘recipes’ found in textbooks on man-
agement and offered by reputation consultants (Byrkjeflot, 2011; Røvik, 2007). 
Our concern is to highlight the different contextual motivations and strategies of 
organisation’s internal actors and the role of networks and coalitions. 
In the public policy literature, policy processes are conceived of as more or 
less independent ‘streams’ of problem definitions, solutions and the politics 
involved in selecting alternative options (Cohen, March and Olsen, 1972; King-
don, 1995). These may be connected by chance or design in ‘policy windows’ 
that appear whenever a major incident occurs that requires action. The agenda 
setting literature holds that criticism and failure can be drivers for change but 
also that new policies can be driven by political ambitions (Kingdon, 1995; 






Polsby, 1984).  
In the latter case policy entrepreneurs convert new ideas into ‘good curren-
cy’ (Mintrom and Vergari, 1996). They have a primary interest in selling ideas 
aimed at effecting dynamic policy change and seek to change the way things are 
done. In this process, the agenda setting literature suggests, policy entrepreneurs 
identify and define problems in a way that attracts the attention and support of 
decision-makers. The entrepreneurs indicate the various options and do so in a 
way that will generate support (Kingdon, 1995; Polsby, 1984). The ways in 
which they seek support are critical to the progress of the policy debate, and in 
this process they are likely to be receptive to different audiences, pressure 
groups, the national mood, personnel changes and new legislative moves (see 
Greve, 2006; Zahariadis, 1999). Knowledge of the organisation, its values and 
social norms allows policy entrepreneurs to create convincing strategies that 
attract supporters (King, 1988; Kingdon, 1995).  
Assembling and maintaining policy communities or coalitions in support of 
specific policy ideas is important, because they can prove valuable political 
resources in discussions of policy change. Such coalitions are understood to 
share a common culture and understanding within specific policy domains, as 
well as basic values and problem perceptions (Kingdon, 1995; Sabatier and Jen-
kins-Smith, 1999). These policy communities are likely to include ‘policy bro-
kers’, people who are concerned to keep the level of political conflict at a mini-
mum and seek reasonable solutions to perceived problems (Sabatier, 1988). Such 
coalitions or networks can be diverse and fragmented or closed and tightly knit, 
and once they are formed, they will seek to inject their shared beliefs into public 
policies; i.e. they are important for shaping policies (Mintrom and Vergari, 
1996).  
Policy changes and policy learning can be the outcome of policy processes. 
Policy-oriented learning is understood as relatively enduring alterations of 
thought or behavioural intentions that result from experience and which is con-
cerned with the attainment (or revision) of policy objectives (Heclo, 1974; Saba-
tier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993, 1999). It has to do with changes in values and 
beliefs. Values can be very stable and fundamental. Known as ‘deep core’ be-
liefs, they are nearly impossible to change. Second, they can be ‘policy core’ 
beliefs. These guide how elected officials, civil servants, and experts view and 
perform their roles. The policy core beliefs serve as a normative image of how 
things ought to be, acting as visions that guide strategic behaviour (Weible, 
2007). A third set of values is related to specific policies, priorities and designs. 
This set of values addresses, for example, detailed rules, and budgetary priorities 
in a programme, public participation guidelines, etc. Policy core beliefs can be 
adjusted in response to new evidence, experiences and information, but the spe-
cific rules, priorities and designs are said to be much easier to change (Zafonte 
and Sabatier, 1998). Therefore, the likely effect of policy programmes will be 
changes in values and the normative images of how things ought to be (major 
changes) or changes in specific policies, priorities and designs (minor changes). 







Municipal agents of change in reputation policy 
It is well known that the public sector faces certain challenges. For instance, 
decision makers have to maintain public support; they have to shield themselves 
against opponents; and they have to balance consistency and flexibility (Carpen-
ter and Krause, 2012). It is argued that reputation policy initiatives in the public 
sector is often contingent of an exogenous crises or events, or a perception of 
policy failure that is generating dissatisfaction (Carpenter, 2001). With this 
comes a demand for doing something new. Carpenter (2001: 30-7) argues that 
bureaucratic entrepreneurship, i.e. processes by which agency leaders experi-
ment with new programmes or introduce innovations to existing programmes, 
are incremental and oriented to assemble network-based coalitions. This type of 
incrementalism is wise because it reduces the risks associated with trial and error 
and demonstrates a capacity to build coalitions around new programme ideas.  
Politicians’ rationale is discussed in the agenda setting literature and politi-
cians are assumed to have the same concern for failures that generates dissatis-
faction (Kingdon, 1995). They want to offer a protective shield in the presence 
of opposition in the form of hostile external audiences (Hood, 2010). Politicians 
may however also be motivated by political ambition. Their ability to direct 
solutions through innovative and carefully thought out strategies is essential for a 
political party to succeed and might well be one of the main driving forces be-
hind a political agent (Polsby, 1984). Political entrepreneurship is of vital im-
portance in the political competition for support. Support, in turn, relies on the 
sensitivity of politicians to outside signals, on what they know and on their abil-
ity to rally coalitions. All this may involve processes of a more radical nature.  
The literature referred to leads us to suggest that administrators are likely to 
cultivate a reputation that will enable them to gain autonomy, seek protection 
from political attack and recruit and retain valued employees (Maor, 2015) and 
to seek incremental changes. The politicians are more likely to attune themselves 
to political entrepreneurship and political competition (Polsby, 1984), showing 
responsiveness in times of crises and applying a broader perspective to questions 
of importance. As agents of change in the field of reputational policies, their 
objectives and preferences are likely to differ. The way they construct and make 
use of networks will likely affect the outcome of their respective reputational 
policies. It is in recognition of this situation that we have undertaken a case study 
to determine how reputational policies are promoted and to what degree policies 
leads to behavioural changes in one municipality in which the chief executive 
officer has the upper hand and a municipality in which the mayor was the advo-
cate of the council’s reputational policies.  
 
Methods 
The two cases were chosen from a larger sample of municipalities (13). Both 
have reputation projects administered by different reputation agents, the first led 
mainly by the mayor, the other mainly by the chief executive officer. Both have 






been actively involved in reputation building processes for some time (since 
2005 and 2007) and are likely to have experienced changes resulting from their 
respective reputation building policies. They have not attended the aforemen-
tioned ‘reputation schools’. Both are medium sized municipalities (populations 
10,000–20,000); they have some similar growth related challenges but have had 
the same people in leadership roles for some time (the mayors and chief execu-
tives are the same then as now). This does not make them representative of all 
municipalities in the same situation, nor of how administrative or political repu-
tation agents work. They are examples we can learn from and use to make sense 
of the phenomena in terms of how individual rationality, context and specific 
opportunities can influence reputation management in municipalities. They shed 
light on differences in agenda setting, implementation and implications of repu-
tation policies in the municipalities. The two municipalities were chosen because 
they have certain socioeconomic similarities in common, while displaying dif-
ferent reputation policies, different ways of pursuing reputation building within 
the municipal organisation and different outcomes in terms of revised values, 
beliefs and behaviour. Interested parties, policy entrepreneurs and networks are 
therefore likely to have mattered when they formulated and practiced their repu-
tation policies. This makes these municipalities a good substrate for demonstrat-
ing the heuristic and to some degree the explanatory value of a policy entrepre-
neur perspective. 
This is a comparative longitudinal case study. The two municipalities were 
monitored for more than three years and are kept anonymous. The empirical 
fieldwork was complemented by additional interviews, some by telephone, after 
a more precise definition of the research problem had been adopted. Information 
emerging in the interviews was validated through document studies and corrobo-
rated against information in municipal documents, media reports and statistics. 
Further information was obtained by studying statements by council leaders in 
minutes of council meetings, reports and web pages concerning their reputation 
promoting efforts and visions. Statistics Norway provided data on population, 
migration, service provision and finances. This form of methodological triangu-
lation was adopted to verify information obtained in interviews.  
The main theoretical assumption is that different policy change agents are 
involved in the formulation, adoption and implementation of municipal reputa-
tion policies. Elite politicians and elite administrators are likely to focus on dif-
ferent interests and strategies and align themselves with different network in the 
pursuit of reputation policies. These differences might in turn lead to different 
outcomes in terms of revised or amended values and behaviour. 
We therefore chose as our key informants the mayors and the chief execu-
tive officers in both municipalities. The four key informants had all held office 
for many years, and had been involved in the reputation building process from 
the start. They were interviewed for about an hour in their office in their munici-
pality, with supplementary, shorter interviews later. We also interviewed a senior 
council officer and two politicians in each municipality, and a key external advi-






Table 1. Overview of empirical data sources 
 Interviews Municipal 
documents 
Media reports Statistics 
Sources of 
empirical 































These latter interviews were intended to verify the information provided by the 
key informants, their understanding of the processes, and to obtain a broader 
picture of the process. The empirical data are from councils involved in reputa-
tion building processes, that is, councils with a special interest in making a good 
impression. This, and the personal interests of the informants, may have influ-
enced what they said in the interviews and how they said it. 
 
North town municipality 
North town has around 10,000 inhabitants. It is growing and situated in a region 
with no other city of comparable size. A major hydrocarbon plant was built in 
the municipality a decade or so ago and triggered an extraordinary rise in pros-
perity and employment. The mayor holds a strong position regionally and his 
party has commanded a solid majority on the council for decades. The mayor 
works closely with the long-serving chief executive officer. Since the beginning 
of the millennium, growth has been powered by the hydrocarbon plant. There 
have been challenges, much to do with major investments made in preparation 
for the prospective hydrocarbon ‘boom’. Indeed, the flow of money into the 
municipal treasury from the hydrocarbon works seemed at first to reduce effi-
ciency in the municipal apparatus. Compared to neighbouring municipalities, 
North town city council had a great many employees on its payroll.  
This council started its work of improving the municipality’s reputation 
eight years ago. The challenge back then concerning service provision was well 
known. Although council services were very well staffed (as nearly one in ten 
inhabitants worked for the council, Statistics Norway; Kostra data), public ser-
vice standards were rated rather poorly in a large local poll. Another main chal-
lenge was to attract qualified personnel. The municipality had lost several key 
employees during 2007. It was, according to the chief executive officer, some-
thing “we had to do something about”. The council also wanted the public both 
locally and further afield to know about the good things the council was doing 
and that it was indeed a professional organisation delivering good 






services. They wanted to be known as a good place to work and live, both to 
attract and retain highly skilled workers. They looked at how other municipali-
ties tackled similar problems, and had been introduced to an employer strategy 
worked out by the association of Norwegian municipalities intended as a means 
to helping councils in similar straits. There was much talk about it in the media 
as well. “At the time we were inspired by reputation management” (council 
member). This strategy came with tools that helped them achieve some of the 
targets (i.e. as they interpreted it, at least) as the package was geared to generate 
public support and satisfied employees. 
The council believed it was the job of the administration to ensure the quali-
ty of municipal services and the municipal workplace. The chief executive took 
charge and proposed a project called “Better use of resources”, to address short-
comings in the municipal economy, organisation and reputation. Planning began 
in 2008. One of the strands of this project was “Reputation and Quality”.  
The chief executive appointed a project group of five persons, two politi-
cians, and three senior officers. The mayor was interested in the project and 
supported the idea of the council making an effort to create a reputation for de-
livering high quality services, but when people mentioned this reputation strate-
gy to him, he referred back to the administrative officials in charge. Two other 
key politicians were included in the project group. They had worked with the 
political aspects of service provision. The council did not want anyone to spend 
time at the Reputation School, nor did they want to hire any of the big consultant 
agencies “as we know people wouldn’t like us spending money on that sort of 
thing” (chief executive). Nonetheless, the project team asked a prominent advi-
sor from a larger municipality in the region to brief them on reputation manage-
ment. This advisor stressed the citizen focus: “The important things are in-
volvement, information and quality.” The council created a slogan based on the 
values of ‘togetherness’ and ‘cooperation’. It encapsulated who they were, ac-
cording to the mayor.  
After this, the project group was largely left to learn what they could from 
the literature and from other municipalities. They read up on the corporate repu-
tation literature, held a series of meetings and divided tasks among themselves. 
They were particularly concerned about service delivery and the idea of local 
people being ‘ambassadors’ for the municipality. They did internet searches and 
looked at how other municipalities had approached reputation planning but did 
not actually visit other reputation building municipalities. They compiled a sim-
ple ‘reputation map’ based on interviews with council officers, leaders, members 
of the public and service users. They read municipal documents, such as the 
main municipal plan, reports on how to make better use of resources, employer 
guidelines, communication plans and briefs on recruitment.  
In 2009, they submitted their strategy. It was however, in this first round, a 
“massive plan with masses of targets, not particularly geared to operationaliza-
tion and use” (chief executive). In addition, it was less attuned to what was con-
sidered the main problem “You can’t build a good reputation without control of 






will never get a good reputation by building a new cultural centre; it will only 
come when people start talking about the fabulous activities going on in there. 
“It’s the substance that’s important” (reputation plan head officer).  
This 2009 plan was revised and geared more to practicalities. A new project 
team was appointed in 2012, but this was too dominated by council officials with 
a couple of politicians with briefs in service task areas. The team sent a draft to 
the different council departments for consultation. The response indicated that 
more could be done to improve working conditions and environments. It also 
indicated that council staff needed media training, and the council’s visual pro-
file needed to be improved. Public meetings about municipal services were sug-
gested. Many of these suggestions were included in the revised strategy of 2013. 
In the words of project leader, the “reputation plan aimed at dispensing some 
‘internal medicine’”.  
The revised reputation project produced a plan that called attention to how 
the council should work to heighten the municipality’s profile and service repu-
tation. This materialized as specific targets: Leaders would attend leadership 
training; the organisation would work to build a good corporate culture; they 
would improve the ethical guidelines; and they would consult with employees 
while ensuring workable procedures for internal communication. This work is 
already under way. The reputation project also led to an awareness of ways of 
raising the municipality’s profile, not least in the media. The project led to plans 
to conduct surveys of the opinions of users and citizens every three years (but 
these are yet to be implemented).  
 
South town municipality 
The municipality has nearly 20,000 inhabitants. It is located near a large city and 
benefits from being a residential area for people working in the city. The mayor 
was then, as now, well known nationally and holds a strong position regionally. 
His party had a majority in the council during the study (2005). He works closely 
with the long-serving chief executive. Demographically, the municipality was 
growing fast, and like other growth municipalities, struggling to provide suffi-
cient housing and public services. Another challenge at the time was the ‘death’ 
of the town centre; a new shopping mall had diverted trade and activity away 
from Main Street. There were economic challenges, but the council was not 
interested in charging a property tax. 
It is difficult to get a clear answer on why this municipality started a brand-
ing process. The official reason is that it wanted to attract new residents and 
business from the wider region and be known as a good service provider and for 
its cultural centre. On the one hand, the reputation strategy seeks to visualize the 
entire span of municipal activity while on the other creating a bond between the 
council and the community, including voluntary organisations, the private sector 
and the public. The project is not only about building the reputation of the coun-
cil in the local community, but in the region and the country as well. A long-term 
plan to build a road to a nearby city would also benefit from a good reputation. 






The mayor wanted people to associate the municipality with something positive. 
Building a reputation was also a political issue because his party articulated 
some very controversial policies back in the 1990s and represented a sort of new 
political culture. The real reason behind the project is probably more complex. 
The mayor had recently survived a personal scandal that made national head-
lines. He had been in, but was now out of national politics as a consequence, and 
“wanted the municipality to be known for something else than his scandal” as 
one anonymous informant put it.  
The mayor was the main driving force in putting reputation policies on the 
municipal agenda. Reputation building was adopted as a council strategy and 
project in 2005, although only reluctantly by the opposition at first. The chief 
executive was to some degree a key figure. The municipality also hired a private 
consultancy with experience in marketing and attitude campaigns for private and 
public companies. An experienced developer (chief developer) of brands and 
attitudes led the consultancy and was familiar with the literature on marketing 
and corporate reputation, and also familiarized himself with the city branding 
literature. The mayor, the chief executive, and the consultancy took firm control 
of the project. 
Although the council had approved this project, “the first job was to ‘an-
chor’ it at the political level” (chief developer) and he started by interviewing 
members of all the political parties in groups, asking what they wanted the mu-
nicipality to be known for. At first, interviewees tended to think of their own 
political programmes but later adopted a broader view. The consultancy then 
interviewed local business people, representatives of NGOs and people in the 
culture and entertainment business. There were also interviews and shorter sur-
veys to the municipal employees. Following these interviews, a group was put 
together consisting of politicians, the chief executive, members of the business 
community, culture, entertainment and voluntary sectors. This group worked 
with the consultancy to distil core values. These included innovation, ‘way of 
life’ and good services. These core values were met with enthusiasm; it was no 
longer conceived as just a project of the mayor’s political party. However, some-
thing needed to be done to prove that the municipality actually delivered on 
these values. According to the chief developer, “seeing what is done works much 
better than just saying what you do” (chief developer). “We do what we say” 
(mayor). They had a logo and a slogan made (South town inspires), and both 
were mounted on all municipal buildings, projects, cars, etc. This was done to 
tell the citizens what the municipality does and was a deliberate marketing ploy. 
The municipality did not advertise their brand in newspapers or other media 
because the council did not find such use of funds legitimate. There was, howev-
er, a very clear strategy to put the different values into practical terms and follow 
up the branding idea with action. “We needed to be specific, and do things to 
show that we mean this” (chief executive). He listed numerous targets based on 
the values of innovation, way of life and good services. The list contained strate-






businesses and residents, to create a vital city centre and erect a new cultural 
centre as well as a new senior citizens’ centre under a new form of management.  
 Another important thing was to develop an internal culture in the municipal 
organisation. “We want results, we listen with respect, we are enthusiastic and 
will support anyone who accomplishes anything and we do what we say” was 
the new mantra of council staff and politicians. The project culminated in a large 
public meeting with 200 people present, including all the different stakeholders. 
The organizers wanted to make sure everyone was aware of the strategy and to 
encourage them to take ‘the message’ further afield. 
South town municipality has gradually established “a sort of culture where 
the people who dislike new approaches have to prove their case” (mayor) and 
“this has made many think differently”. The senior citizens’ centre, the vacation 
tours and building projects are examples of a political vision translated into prac-
tical politics, according to the chief executive and the mayor. The senior citi-
zens’ centre is divided into two parts. One half is run by a private firm, the other 
by the council. It was an alternative to privatizing the whole thing or keeping it 
public. The two units are frequently evaluated to find out which performs best. 
The model has attracted much publicity and has been studied by other local 
councils, some of which have adopted the idea. Holiday trips for the elderly to 
the Mediterranean are another example. Pensioners pay their own fare but are 
accompanied by municipal staff. The council organizes the tours. It is a highly 
popular initiative and has been extended to people with disabilities. Other mu-
nicipalities are following suit. Today, the principle of public innovation is per-
haps especially apparent in the building and planning sector; the council has one 
of the shortest periods for deciding on planning and building permissions. Ideal-
ly, there should be a split between the political and administrative units in such 
projects, but in this municipality, they have project teams that involve both poli-
ticians and administrators. “The innovative oriented mantra is what we live by”, 
say both the mayor and chief executive and the opposition agrees. “We ask every 
applicant for a council job in the initial interview if they can adhere to these 
values [want results, listen with respect, enthusiastically supporting, do what we 
say]” (chief executive). 
The council has developed a distinct approach to its environment. “When I 
speak to people in surrounding municipalities I tell them about our municipality 
and what we stand for,” says the mayor. “They come to me with their ideas and 
ask me to help them put them into practice.” “People know that they can trust us 
when we say something,” says the chief executive. The council’s reputation 
policy is detailed and expressed in very practical terms. It is summarized in a 
small business card-like folder that outlines the reputation-building programme 
with a diagram and a few but coherent ideas and words. 
The council has pretty much reached its aims; it has now a new cultural cen-
tre, an innovative way of managing care for the elderly and a new highway 
planned and financed. On the other hand, reviving the city centre has proven 
difficult. South town is clearly an innovating municipality, unique in its ap-
proaches to problem-solving and service delivery. For this it is well known in the 






region and even wider afield. The process has led to a consensus about ‘what 
matters most’ for the municipality’s reputation’ in the minds of the politicians. 
There is no disagreement about having chosen innovation as the core value. 
 
Analysis  
In these cases, reputation management is firmly embedded in council procedures 
and philosophy, and in their respective missions. The councils build their reputa-
tion by ‘doing something’. This article has inquired how the council leaderships 
act like agents to promote reputation policies, the role of networks and their 
implications. In city council it is advanced by the chief executive and associated 
with the values (corporate values of a more general nature) prevailing among the 
council officers. In South town, the mayor is the one advancing reputational 
policies and the policy is associated with the values of innovation. From the 
public policy perspective, we have learned that personal ambitions and political 
interests (Polsby, 1984) can drive new policies. This is what characterizes the 
mayor’s agenda in the reputational policy in South town. Further, we have 
learned that new policies can be promoted and made part of the common values 
and behaviour through networks (Sabatier and Jenkins- Smith, 1999) which was 
evident in both municipalities. We have also seen that private agents of change 
can play a very important role in policy processes (Kingdon, 1995) that involve 
reputation management. 
The policy processes could be understood as constructed from rather inde-
pendent streams of problem definitions, solutions and the politics or procedures 
of choosing between alternatives (Cohen et al., 1972; Kingdon, 1995). A poll of 
users and citizens revealed a problem with the quality of services. Service provi-
sion needed better organisation, better working conditions and there was a need 
for greater accommodation of customer needs. There was a ‘policy window’ 
(Kingdon, 1995) in the municipalities that facilitated the introduction of reputa-
tion policies on the municipal agenda. Various parties and sources, including the 
corporate branding literature, offered credible solutions of how to proceed. Rep-
utation building was the national flavour of the month. The problem was gener-
ally acknowledged among politicians who were receptive to whatever a reputa-
tion policy could deliver. The ‘streams’ of problem definitions, solutions and 
politics involved in selecting alternatives came together apparently by chance in 
a new ‘policy window’.  
The public policy literature holds that criticism and failures can be drivers 
for change, but also that new policies can be driven by political ambitions 
(Polsby, 1984). South town had different challenges from North town. There 
were several definitions of what was wrong. In the public debate, the challenges 
identified pertained to the reviving of a ‘vibrant city centre’, the need for a new 
main commuting road and other things that are quite normal challenges for a 
municipality. However, the mayor and the other informants did not use the word 
crisis when it came to these challenges. There was however a crisis, and the 






was involved had sullied the municipality’s name. Something needed to be done 
but there were no obvious solutions available. Knowledge of the organisation, its 
values and social norms allows policy entrepreneurs to create convincing strate-
gies that attract supporters (King, 1988; Kingdon, 1995) and the mayor of South 
town used such knowledge by referring to the municipal challenges as a motiva-
tion for reputational policies. These challenges were perceived as legitimate 
motivations both by the opposition and by the citizens. In South town, the mayor 
was driven by his political ambitions. He was also aiming to move attention 
away from the scandal towards the good things going on in the municipality. In 
South town, the ‘policy window’ was opened by the actions of the mayor rather 
than by chance.  
Assembling policy coalitions is important in accomplishing policy change 
and such coalitions are often based on core values shared by all and a common 
understanding of problems and solutions within specific policy domains (Saba-
tier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999). In North town, the process was mainly driven by 
the chief executive and a few leading politicians who managed to get the idea 
debated. They formed groups of people with a strong interest in the project and 
worked with these people for a long time. They read the relevant literature and 
council documents; they reached out to employees at different levels of the or-
ganisation and to users. This was the proper way of dealing with the council’s 
service departments. They formed coalitions of specialists and political actors 
with a special interest in service provision. These actors already shared the poli-
cy’s core values and problem perceptions. The coalition made use of an entre-
preneurial strategy in line with the bureaucratic reputation literature by incre-
mentally introducing innovations to existing programmes (Carpenter, 2001).  
In South town, the mayor teamed up with the chief executive and a private 
marketing agency, politicians from other parties, the business community and 
civil society organisations. This type of broad-based coalitions is common in 
local politics in Norway. Municipal politicians have to deal with competition 
within and between the parties and with diverging interests and values (i.e. dif-
ferent policy core values).They attend to several different tasks, addressing dif-
ferent audiences. Scandinavian politicians most often also have to achieve con-
sensus about what policies to pursue (Bjørnå, 2014; Brorström, 2015; Larsen, 
2005; Sørensen and Torfing, 2013), to get them onto the agenda and make them 
last in a multiparty system where solutions often require complex negotiations. 
This makes a virtue of keeping the level of political conflict at a minimum and to 
seek compromises and to behave as a ‘policy broker’ (see Sabatier, 1988) to get 
enduring support. Such consensus orientation makes it necessary to build coali-
tions with differentiated representation in order to create common grounds for an 
enduring and effective reputational policy. This again, implies forging coalitions 
and building some degree of convergence in reputational policies. 
More than one reputation agent was involved and had influence in South 
town. The chief consultant developer was very much to the fore of the imple-
mentation process, and he constructed coalitions that combined people with 
expertise on different features of the municipality and on running marketing and 






attitude campaigns. In this case, reputation management is more radical and 
distinct as a policy programme, aimed to encourage public support and prevent 
crises. It is an example of an entrepreneurial strategy as described in the public 
policy literature (see Polsby, 1984; Kingdon, 1995).  
Policy changes can be the outcome of policy processes. There can be chang-
es in values, beliefs and behaviour as a result of such processes and changes can 
be major or minor (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993;1999) and branding pro-
cesses can facilitate integration of strategies and organisational change (Korn-
berger, 2010). These municipalities have worked on their reputation policies for 
a long time. Are there any implications for behaviour and for how ‘proper roles’ 
should be understood that could be seen to result from the reputation manage-
ment process? Such changes are minor in North town. They affect design and 
priorities and involve steps to improve leadership and dialogue with the junior 
sections of the council, citizens, and service users. The project paid attention to 
procedures and developed a normative view of how public servants should be-
have. The values and views on how things should be done in the council have 
however not changed much. The essence is to make a pleasant, productive work-
ing environment for the staff, and deliver public services of a high standard. 
After some initial problems, they decided to be known for adhering to accepted 
rules and norms of service delivery and proper working conditions. In the ‘bu-
reaucratic reputation’ literature this is known as striving for a ‘procedural reputa-
tion’ (Carpenter, 2010; Carpenter and Krause, 2012; Maor, 2015).  
South town saw major changes in priorities and core values. These changes 
can be attributed to the management of reputation in both the political and ad-
ministrative systems. The values and beliefs that guide strategic behaviour in the 
municipality have changed, as have dominant ways of thinking within the mu-
nicipal apparatus. South town has seen a broader and more consistent change in 
attitudes and beliefs than North town and is accustomed to differentiating how it 
protects the interests of the community and creates results. It is thus, according 
to the ‘bureaucratic reputation’ literature, through the ‘moral’ and ‘performative’ 
dimensions they seek to advance their reputation (Carpenter, 2010; Carpenter 
and Krause, 2012; Maor, 2015). 
Another finding is that the reputation agent in North town, the chief execu-
tive, set up and engaged in networks with participants that already shared a set of 
common norms. This agent inspired reputational policies that in turn led to mi-
nor and incremental changes in specific beliefs about policies, priorities and 
designs. The mayor in South town, on the other hand, used a consultant to help 
him create coalitions to forge a set of common set of values and norms. These 
norms informed the design of the reputation building policies and changes in 
core policy beliefs. The result was a major change in how council politicians and 
officials approach new tasks and challenges.  
The reputation agents’ strategies were different in several ways. The way 
they implemented reputational policies varied as well as the way in which they 
involved and forged networks and coalitions. This, again, affected the outcome 






tional actors who look for support in ways that are receptive to both their posi-
tion and signals from networks and different audiences. This is likely to affect 
reputational processes and their outcomes.  
 
Conclusions 
In municipalities, the reputation policy agents tend to be the chief executive or 
the mayor, each with their own networks and interests. In this study, these key 
agents had different roles, interests and strategies; the mayor was much attuned 
to political entrepreneurship and political competition, showing responsiveness 
in times of crises and applying a broader perspective to questions of importance. 
The chief executive was seeking protection from political attacks, and to recruit 
and retain valued employees. As agents of change in the field of reputational 
policies, their objectives and preferences differed. The way they set up networks 
differed. The political actor’s network had a broad focus, scope and membership 
and the administrative actor’s network had a narrow focus, scope and member-
ship. This, in turn, influenced and led to different outcomes. In the political, 
agent-driven reputation policy, it brought about changes in fundamental policy 
values. The reputational policy driven by the administrative agent increased 
people’s awareness of procedures. This shows that reputation policy agents with-
in a municipal organisation may have different interests and forge different net-
works and strategies. How they go about this may have a vast impact on what is 
ultimately implemented and on the results of the process. 
Municipal actors relate to diverse audiences, including the media, policy ex-
perts, central government, and citizens. In these two cases, reputation manage-
ment was put on the agenda because the council was persuaded that it could be 
used to offset crises in confidence and to raise awareness of political uniqueness. 
In Norway, especially in the years 2000 to 2010, reputation building seemed to 
have been understood as a panacea. The reputational policies however, vary. 
Municipalities adopt different approaches in order to appear unique in the public 
eye.  
This article has introduced a public policy perspective to explore how coun-
cil elites promote reputation management. It has focused on how different policy 
change agents are involved in the formulation, adoption and implementation of 
municipal reputation policies, and what this has led to. This is an alternative 
approach to that of investigating how a reputational ‘recipe’ is translated into the 
public organisation and of investigating reputation as an amalgamation of collec-
tive perceptions or as a position in reputational rankings. The main findings 
produced by this approach are that the reputational agent’s motives and political-
ly conscious strategies matter and that these may differ with the agent’s position 
in the organisation. We also find that reputation policies are only likely to make 
it to the local agenda if network coalitions put their shoulder to the wheel and 
lobby for change. The perhaps most important finding, however, is that reputa-
tion management policies can affect how broader governance plays out, particu-
larly if key politicians are involved as agents of change. Reputation policies can 






change the thought patterns, values and beliefs that constitute the different roles 
in the organisation, and new attitudes may lead to change in how things are done 
on a general level in most parts of the politico-administrative organisation. 
These are the findings of a study of just two municipalities that have created 
and worked individually with reputation projects over a long period. It is a study 
of actors who have a special interest in giving a selective version of motives, 
processes and outcomes. These are limitations to this particular study. The ad-
vantage of this approach, however, is that it ‘forces’ us to look at reputation 
policies from a different and untraditional point of view by drawing on a policy 
entrepreneur perspective. This has allowed us to study several new strands of 
what is going on in reputation building agencies and what’s coming out of it. It 
has highlighted different contextual motivations and strategies of organisations’ 
internal actors and the role of networks and coalitions. Further research in the 
emerging field of research on public sector reputation building and management 
could aim to be inspired by ‘untraditional approaches’ as new approaches raise 
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